Tackling the "Empty Treasury" Syndrome
In an interesting editorial in today's Guardian (Nigeria), Reuben Abati highlights the deplorable circumstance, reflected in outcries by a number of incoming governors, that the outgoing administration in many states left an "empty treasury". Whilst it is not unknown for governments to run on deficit (e.g. the well known case of the US), what makes the circumstances described particularly insidious is that the reason that the accounts of the particular Nigerian administrations are said to be in such tatters is as a result of alleged looting and grand corruption said to be going as high as the outgoing governor. Indeed an unhealthily sizable number of governors who left office following the recent elections in Nigeria are, in one sense, currently helping the Nigerian anti-fraud "watch-dog", the EFCC, with enquiries.
As is well known, the last federal administration embarked on a high-profile ostensible anti-corruption drive with the establishment of a number of bodies, including the EFCC, with responsibilities for tackling corruption. However, one shortcoming with the anti-corruption strategy and others over the years is that the emphasis has typically been on prosecuting offenders and, more usefully, recovering some of their loot. What has been lacking, or at least not so evident, is the adoption of measures designed in the first place to prevent as much as possible, or at least to reduce the opportunities for, the looting of public funds by public officials abusing their powers and the authority of their office.
Without by any means attempting to provide an exhaustive solution to the problem of corruption, it is possible to float a couple of practical and "proactive" measures that might help to pre-empt official corruption for further exploration and consideration.
1. "The Whistle-blower Doctrine"
In the particular circumstances of Nigeria, it will be helpful to have a framework whereby persons, particularly those working in sensitive positions such as the Treasury, Finance Ministries etc, with information of corruption or potential corruption can safely, confidentially and with guaranteed anonymity report such event. Even granted that many people in such positions may themselves be compromised, the framework should be put in place for those among their rank who still have a sense of duty and conscience or who develop a change of heart to feel safe to do what is right.
Typically, fear of reprisals by an "all powerful" executive or superior is a discouraging factor for a potential "whistle-blower" and, as such, there is a more general and wider need to tackle general "ultra vires" (actions beyond official powers) and, worse, abuse of powers. Of course, there are constitutionally or statutorily defined limits to official powers and there are the typical constitutional/administrative law remedies. However, these take long to pursue if at all there is any political will to pursue them. In the meantime, a safe and anonymous reporting system is likely to at least provide a practical encouragement to someone that may be minded to expose official corruption.
2. "The Audit Principle"
Consideration might be given to a statutory requirement of two layers of independent/external auditing of the accounts of the relevant levels of government (especially local and state) and some state organs. In the first place the monthly internally audited accounts of these organs and levels of government would be submitted to an external body like the EFCC, adequately resourced and competently staffed, to provide a basis for ongoing and independent monitoring of state funds and the uses to which they are put. Secondly, a scheme of at least annual independent external audit akin to that which applies to private sector companies might be put in place, granted with possible caveats and protection of official secret. Indeed, the scheme might have some flexibility built in to allow for such an event to occur biannually or even quarterly where appropriate.
3. "The Basic Public Transparency Principle"
This is a suggestion that a basic monthly account of each tier of government setting out at the minimum the ratio of total expenditure to total revenue for the particular month should be made publicly available under a statutory duty. This should also include an outline of the projects and items that the expenditure involved.
These are just basic outline ideas that no doubt have weaknesses. The essential point, however, is that while apprehending and prosecution corrupt officials is commendable, the fight against official corruption will be that much strengthened if at least equal devotion is given to measures that may potentially prevent or reduce of fraud and corruption in the first place.
As is well known, the last federal administration embarked on a high-profile ostensible anti-corruption drive with the establishment of a number of bodies, including the EFCC, with responsibilities for tackling corruption. However, one shortcoming with the anti-corruption strategy and others over the years is that the emphasis has typically been on prosecuting offenders and, more usefully, recovering some of their loot. What has been lacking, or at least not so evident, is the adoption of measures designed in the first place to prevent as much as possible, or at least to reduce the opportunities for, the looting of public funds by public officials abusing their powers and the authority of their office.
Without by any means attempting to provide an exhaustive solution to the problem of corruption, it is possible to float a couple of practical and "proactive" measures that might help to pre-empt official corruption for further exploration and consideration.
1. "The Whistle-blower Doctrine"
In the particular circumstances of Nigeria, it will be helpful to have a framework whereby persons, particularly those working in sensitive positions such as the Treasury, Finance Ministries etc, with information of corruption or potential corruption can safely, confidentially and with guaranteed anonymity report such event. Even granted that many people in such positions may themselves be compromised, the framework should be put in place for those among their rank who still have a sense of duty and conscience or who develop a change of heart to feel safe to do what is right.
Typically, fear of reprisals by an "all powerful" executive or superior is a discouraging factor for a potential "whistle-blower" and, as such, there is a more general and wider need to tackle general "ultra vires" (actions beyond official powers) and, worse, abuse of powers. Of course, there are constitutionally or statutorily defined limits to official powers and there are the typical constitutional/administrative law remedies. However, these take long to pursue if at all there is any political will to pursue them. In the meantime, a safe and anonymous reporting system is likely to at least provide a practical encouragement to someone that may be minded to expose official corruption.
2. "The Audit Principle"
Consideration might be given to a statutory requirement of two layers of independent/external auditing of the accounts of the relevant levels of government (especially local and state) and some state organs. In the first place the monthly internally audited accounts of these organs and levels of government would be submitted to an external body like the EFCC, adequately resourced and competently staffed, to provide a basis for ongoing and independent monitoring of state funds and the uses to which they are put. Secondly, a scheme of at least annual independent external audit akin to that which applies to private sector companies might be put in place, granted with possible caveats and protection of official secret. Indeed, the scheme might have some flexibility built in to allow for such an event to occur biannually or even quarterly where appropriate.
3. "The Basic Public Transparency Principle"
This is a suggestion that a basic monthly account of each tier of government setting out at the minimum the ratio of total expenditure to total revenue for the particular month should be made publicly available under a statutory duty. This should also include an outline of the projects and items that the expenditure involved.
These are just basic outline ideas that no doubt have weaknesses. The essential point, however, is that while apprehending and prosecution corrupt officials is commendable, the fight against official corruption will be that much strengthened if at least equal devotion is given to measures that may potentially prevent or reduce of fraud and corruption in the first place.
